Economic Analysis of Two Cost-Share Programs to Improve Ground Water Quality; Fencing: A Marketing Alternative by Pflueger, Burton et al.
South Dakota State University
Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional
Repository and Information Exchange
Economics Commentator Department of Economics
3-27-1995
Economic Analysis of Two Cost-Share Programs to
Improve Ground Water Quality; Fencing: A
Marketing Alternative
Burton Pflueger
South Dakota State University, burton.pflueger@sdstate.edu
Lon Henning
South Dakota State University
Thomas Dobbs
South Dakota State University
Richard Shane
South Dakota State University, richard.shane@sdstate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://openprairie.sdstate.edu/econ_comm
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, and the Regional Economics
Commons
This Newsletter is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics at Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access
Institutional Repository and Information Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Commentator by an authorized administrator of
Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional Repository and Information Exchange. For more information, please contact
michael.biondo@sdstate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Pflueger, Burton; Henning, Lon; Dobbs, Thomas; and Shane, Richard, "Economic Analysis of Two Cost-Share Programs to Improve
Ground Water Quality; Fencing: A Marketing Alternative" (1995). Economics Commentator. Paper 316.
http://openprairie.sdstate.edu/econ_comm/316
ECONOMICS
COMMENTA TOR
SDSU
No. 347 March 27, 1995South Dakota State University
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
TWO COST-SHARE
PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE
GROUND WATER QUALITY
Burton Pflueger, Ext. Specialist
Lon Henning, Research Asst. &
Thomas Dobhs, Professor
There has been a great deal of speculation regarding
the course of U.S. farm policy in Ae remainder of this
decade. As policymakers prepare the 1995 farm bill,
there is an increased interest in weighing the promise
of policyoptions such as "green" or "stewardship"
programs. A recent task force emphasized the
challenges in the Great Plains region of providing
sufficient^economic incentives to induce voluntary
adoption of farming practices and systems that are
friendly to water quality. "Green" programs could
help to provide the required economic incentive.
The goal of the research reported in this article
was to determine whether the economic incentives
offered through certain existing environmental
provisions of the Federal faim program are sufficient
to induce Western Com Belt/Northem Great Plains
farmers in environmentally sensitive areas to adopt
farming practices and systems that are thought to
improve ground water quality.
"Green" Programs
Attention was focused on the Integrated Crop
Management (ICM) cost-share program and the Water
Quality Incentive Program (WQIP). These programs
started as pilot efforts in the early 1990's and, thus
far, have had limited funding. National policymakers
need to know whether these programs are viable
options to expand upon and/or substantially modify in
the 1995 farm bill. This research is intended to
provide such policy insights for grain farming areas in
which ground water quality is a critical concern.
The ICM program incorporates pest and nutrient
management, crop selection and rotation, and
conservation measures into a more comprehensive
management program than is usually associated with
(Continued on p. 2)
FENCING:
A MARKETING
ALTERNATIVE
Richard Shane
Extension Grain
Marketing Specialist
Many farmers like the idea of buying put options
to set a minimum price for a commodity they are
producing and will deliver to market at a later date.
This strategy is a form of price insurance. The
producer picks a strikeprice to set a level of price
protection and pays a premium that varies in amount
with the level of protection desired. If a high price is
desired, a high premium is paid and if a lower price is
desired, a lower premium is paid. After the farmer
buys the put, if price goes up, the put expires
worthless and a higher cash price is received; if price
goes down, the put is offset to collect the premium
which can be added to the lower cash price.
Currently, for new crop soybeans, a November
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT^ $6.00 put can be
bought for 33 cents per bushel on a 5,000 bushel
contract (1,000 bushel contracts are available). The
minimum expected price (floor price) at harvest is
calculated by subtracting the premium and the basis
from the strike price, as follows:
Put Strategy ~ Buy November $6.00 CBOT
Soybean Option
STRIKE PRICE
Premium
Expected Basis
Minimum Price
$6.00
- .33
- .50
Basis is the relationship between your local price
and the Chicago futures price and can be obtained
from historical records. Expected basis, estimated
when the put is purchased, and actual basis, known at
harvest time, can be different and thus the minimum
price of $5.17 per bushel could vary by a few cents
per bushel.
(Continued on p. 4)
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Agricultural Conservation Program cost share.
Practices may include soil and tissue testing, field
scouting, cover crops, green manures, improved
rotations, composting, and other techniques for
reducing the use of agri-chemicals.
The WQIP is a voluntary program to encourage
producers to adopt practices that improve water
quality. It provides incentive payments for farms to
develop and implement 3- to 5-year farm management
plans that will protect water qu^ity through reduction
in the waste stream of agricultural pollutants, including
fertilizer, manure, and pesticides. Participating
farmers must agree to implement a water quality plan
approved by the USDA, r^rt their usage rates of
nutrient, pesticide, and animal waste materials for the
previous 3 years, and supply well test results, soil
tests, tissue tests, and £q>plication levels to the Natural
Resomces Conservation Service and the local
conservation district for each year in the program.
The research r^rted in this article is being
conducted on case farms over the Big Sioux Aquifer
(BSA). Preventing ground water contamination from
fertUizers, pesticides, and animal wastes is a major
objective, of the BSA Water Quality Demonstration
Projea. The BSA Project is aimed at protecting
ground water quality in shallow aquifers by identifying
farm management practices which are environment^ly
sound and economically feasible. The goal is to
promote voluntary adoption of innovative production
practices, management systems, and land treatment to
reduce or eliminate contamination of the aquifer by
agricultural operations.
Methods of Analysis
Four case study farms are being used for analyses.
They represent different farm sizes, soils, cropping
systems, topography, and management in the BSA
study area.
The case farms are a mix of three dryland
operations and one irrigated operation. Farm is a
dryland operation that uses reduced tillage on a corn-
soybean rotation, with some alfalfa. Farm ff2 is a
dryland operation that uses some aspects of reduced
tillage on com, soybeans, and oats. Farm #3 is a
dryland operation that has com, soybeans, oats,
alfalfa, and clover. This is a part-time farm that uses
a high level of stewardship. Farm #4 is an irrigated
operation that uses conventional tillage on continuous
com under a center-pivot sprinkler irrigation system.
Crop enterprise budgets have been developed for
these farms using a budget generator package called
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CARE (Cost And Retum Estimator). Profitability
results (from CARE) for individual crops, fields, and
soils have been aggregated to a rotation and farming
system level with special spreadsheets that take
Federal farm program acreage set-aside requirements
into account.
Farming system analyses were conducted by
examining the profitability of the system before and
after enrollment in the ICM program and/or the
WQIP. In addition to "before" and "after" analyses,
we conducted profitability analyses for possible
additional practice changes. Tbese are changes that
some farmers are not actually using yet, but that could
be added to the "after" scenario. One is banding
fertilizer at planting and another is splitting nitrogen
fertilizer applications. Other changes involve system
changes. The system changes involve switching to
more diverse crop rotations than existed in the
"before" and "after" scenarios for each individual case
farmer.
Results
The per acre profitability results shown in Table 1
are composites for all farming systems on the affected
fields of each case farm; they were determined by
dividing the "whole-farm" results by the number of
acres. Shown in the first row of data are "baseline"
net returns/acre for each case farm; these represent net
returns in a "typical" year "before" entering the ICM
or WQIP program. In the second row are estimates of
what net returns are likely to be in a typical year
"after" entering into the ICM or WQIP program and
making associated farm management adjustments.
Estimated "before" and "after" net returns on Case
Farm #1 were the same, because the crop consulting
services received under the ICM program for that farm
did not lead directly to any farming practice or system
changes. Estimated net returns increased substantially
on Case Farm #2 (by $30/acre), where the ICM
program contributed to a decision to switch to no-till
practices for com and soybeans and to begin drilling
soybeans. Net returns were estimated to increase by
$6/acre on Case Farm #3, where the WQIP involv^
reduced usage of inorganic fertilizer and changes in
pesticides on com. Estimated net returns increased
substantially ($18/ac) on Case Farm #4, where the
WQIP involved eliminating dry preplant inorganic
fertilizer.
The third and fourth rows of data in Table 1
constitute profitability estimates for possible additional
practice changes. Each—analyzed individually, rather
than in combination-appears to add modestly to net
profitability in each case.
The final rows show estimates for four additional
hypothetical scenarios, these involving system
changes. All involve changes to more diverse crop
rotations than existed in the "before" and "after"
scenarios. Thefirst two include oats (as a nurse crop
for alfalfa), alfalfa (harvested for 2 years after
seeding), soybeans, and com in 6-year rotations. In
one alternative, soybeans are grown 2 years out of 6
and com is only grown 1 year; in theother, soybeans
are grown 1 year and com is grown 2 years. Both of
these scenarios appear to add to net farm profitability-
compared to the "after" scenario on Case Farms #1,
#2, and
The last two altematives are system changes for
Case Farm #4. This farm also has hypothetical
scenarios that involve system changes to more diverse
rotations, but the scenarios are different from those of
the other farms because the irrigated farm's baseline
involves a continuous com rotation. In one
altemative, a 6-year rotation, alfalfa (clear-seeded) is
harvested 2 years, and soybeans and com are each
grown fpr 2 years. The other altemative for Case
Farm #4' is a com/soybean rotation. (Com/soybean
rotations were part of the baseline for some of the
other case farms.) Neither one of these system
altematives j^pear to be as profitable as the
continuous com rotation in the "after" scenario.
Sensitivityanalyses were conducted for alfalfa
yields and prices. The purpose of these analyses was
to determine how sensitive the rankings of the
different systems were to a.ssumed alfalfa prices and
yields. Farm #1 and Fann #3 required a drop of 35%
or more in alfalfa prices or alfalfa yields before the
diverse systems became less profitable than the
baseline "after" systems. These farms have some
alfalfa in their baseline systems, which explains the
large percentage drop in prices or yields needed to
make the diverse systems less profitable. Farm #2
does not have alfalfa in its baseline system. This farm
would require an 18% drop inprices or a 25% drop in
yields before the diverse systems would become less
profitable than the baseline system.
Profitability comparisons are not considered to be
very sensitive to assumed alfalfa prices and yields for
these farms, sincepercentage decreases were in excess
of 10% before profitability rankings were affected.
These sensitivity analyses were not conducted for
Farm #4 because the baseline system (continuous com
under a center-pivot irrigation system) was more
profitable than the diverse rotation using assumed
prices and yields.
Conclusions
Economic results showed no change in "typical
year" net profits "after" participation inICM or WQIP
(compared to "before" participation) on one farm, a
modest increase on another, and substantial increases
on the other two. These results imply thatthe ICM
program and the WQIP can enhance the profitability of
some farms, while encouraging practices to improve
water quality. Simulation of additional practice
changes thought to improve ground water quality
showed possible modest increases in profits.
Simulated system changes, involving adoption of more
diverse crop rotations, also added to profitability under
some circumstances.
T^ble 1. Profitabilitv Estimates for Selected Management Scenarios on Four Case. Farm^
Net retums to land and management tS/ac1
Management ggenario C?$e Farm #1 Case Farm #2 Case Farm #3 Case Farm #4
Baseline ("before" ICM or WQIP)
"After" ICM or WQIP
Banding fertilizer at planting
Splitting nitrogen applications
Diverse rotation with 1 yr oats,
2 yrs alfalfa, 2 yrs soybeans, &
1 yr com (between soybean years)
Diverse rotation with 1 yr oats,
2 yrs alfalfa, 2 yrs com, &
1 yr soybeans (between com yrs)
Diverse rotation with 2 yrs alfalfa,
2 yrs soybeans, & 2 yrs com
Com/soybean rotation
$92 $39 $95 $63
$92 $69 $101 $81
N/A $71 $102 N/A
$93 $73 $102 $88
$109 $96 $109 N/A
$106 $83 $111 N/A
N/A N/A N/A $54
N/A N/A N/A $75
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(Fencing ... com'dfrom p.l)
If a producer is leery of paying 33C per bushel or
around $10 per acre for price insurance, a technique
called fencing can be used to set a minimum price that
covers cost of production but reduces upside potential
compared to the buy a put strategy. With fencing, the
marketer seeks a strike price on a put option that
carries a premium similar in amount to a higher strike
price call option. The put option is bought and the
call option is sold. Premium paid for the put offsets
premium received for the call.. Selling the call
requires margining and sets a ceiling on the amount
of price upside potenti ,-! the marketer could receive.
One objective of the call pi.irtion of the fence is to pick
a strike price that is high ert-ough so that there is a low
probability of pries getting that high.
Currently, new crop soybean options offer a very
good fencing opportunity. A $5.50 November put can
be bought for IOC per bushel and a $7.75 call can be
sold for IOC per bushel. The price floor and ceiling
are as follows:
Fence Strategy —Buy November $5.50 Put Option
and Sell November $7.75 Call Option
Floor Price - Put Ceiling Price - Call
STRIKE PRICE $5.50 STRIKE PRICE $7.75
Premium - Put - .10 Premium - Put - .10
Premium - Call + .10 Premium - Call + .10
Basis Basis - .50
Minimum Price $5.00 Maximum Price
If the fiitures price goes below the strike price for
the put after this strategy is executed, the put is sold
and the premium collected offsets a decline in cash
soybeajyprice. The premium originallycollected for
selling the call is kq)t. However, that premium is
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reduced by the original premium paid for the put. If
futures prices go up but not beyond the $7.75 call
strike price, the soybean cash price goes up, the put is
worthless and the marketer keeps the IOC call
premium. If the futures price goes above the $7.75
call strike price, margin money is paid to cover call
losses, but they are offset by increases in the cash
price. The put is worthless and expires. The put
premium of IOC per bushel was paid up front and is a
business cost, but it is offset by the IOC premium
received when the call was sold.
As with the put strategy, if the actual basis at
harvest does not equal the estimated basis of 50c per
bu.'ihel under the futures, the net price received will
change from the expected minimum or maximum by
the amount actual basis differs from expected basis.
This marketing alternative can be used for any
commodity that has futures and options contracts.
Sometimes the market doesn't offer a wide fence,
difference between expected minimum and maximum
price, like the opportunity currently offered in
soybeans, but the astute marketer evaluates the
opportunities often and executes the fence when it fits
the business' marketing plan.
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